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Introduction
At the end of  the millennium, representations of  megacities began to circulate widely. The burgeoning 
metropolises of  the global South became increasingly the focus of  intense interest. As we often now hear, the 
urban population of  the planet is about to outnumber the rural, and cities, it is predicted, will absorb nearly all 
additional world population growth. Yet it is not the “global” or “world” cities (Sassen 2001; Taylor 2004)—the 
command and control nodes of  the global economy—that are expected to host this demographic explosion, 
but rather the “big but not powerful” megacities of  the Third World (Massey 1999, 115; cited in Robinson 
2002, 540).1 The metropolitan centers that once represented for much of  the world the imagined future of  
modernity—London and Paris in the nineteenth century, New York and Tokyo in the twentieth—are now 
widely seen as relics of  the past. These model cities of  the modern era now appear as anachronistic bygones, 
while places like São Paulo and Bombay seem to presage what is to come. According to some calculations, 
27 of  the 33 urban agglomerations predicted to dominate the global cityscape within ten years will be located 
in the least developed countries (Global Urban Observatory; cited in Koolhaas et al. 2001, 6). We often hear 
that more than one billion people now live in the urban slums and shantytowns of  the global South, and 
this is where the majority of  world population growth will take place. In the twenty-first century, it is hard to 
resist the conclusion that the expanding megacities of  over 8 to 10 million inhabitants, and the astounding 
hypercities of  20 million or more, have become the new “cities of  the future.” 
Cities of the Future? Megacities and the 
Space/Time of Urban Modernity
Austin Zeiderman
This essay examines the popular representation of megacities as “cities of the future.” It argues 
that rather than remapping the familiar, Eurocentric geography of urban modernity, this discourse 
reasserts relations between historical time and geographical space that remain centered in Europe 
and North America. By focusing on one of the so-called “megacities of the Third World” (Bogotá, 
Colombia), this essay also considers what kinds of governmental projects the discourse on the 
megacity inspires and enables. It then concludes with the provocation to imagine forms of urban 
theory and practice that challenge the imagined spatial and temporal coordinates on which these 
projections of urban futurity are based.
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The goal of  this essay is to examine the “megac-
ity” as a category emanating primarily from within 
the global North to denote the rapidly-growing me-
tropolises of  the global South. After reviewing 
popular representations of  megacities as “cities of  
the future,” it will analyze this trend through the 
critical lens of  postcolonial theory, which will allow 
for a discussion of  the global order envisioned by 
this discourse. At first glance, framing the world by 
transferring the title “cities of  the future” from mod-
ern cities to megacities seems to radically rearrange 
a familiar, Eurocentric relationship between history 
and geography. However, in what follows, I aim to 
show instead that it reinscribes the place of  the West 
in the global order by reasserting relations between 
historical time and geographical space that remain 
centered in Europe and North America—yet with a 
disturbing twist. Sensitized to the semantics of  the 
“megacity,” we can then examine what work is being 
done in its name; a focus on one of  the so-called 
“megacities of  the Third World” (Bogotá, Colombia) 
enables us to consider with more clarity and precision 
what the discourse on the megacity does: what kinds 
of  governmental projects does it inspire and enable? 
The essay concludes with questions that indicate the 
need to re-conceptualize such views of  cities of  the 
global South in order to make way for an urban theory 
and practice that unravels and eludes the spatial and 
temporal coordinates that have been fundamental 
to dominant notions of  urban modernity and, by 
extension, Euro-American hegemony.
Urban Futurity: Global Projections,     
Local Anxieties
The idea that megacities of  the global South are the 
“cities of  the future” is compelling. And, indeed, 
it has succeeded in capturing the imagination of  a 
wide range of  urbanist commentators in Europe and 
North America. Their publications claim to offer their 
readership, for the most part also located in the West, 
a view from which to envision the world’s cities in the 
decades to come. Consider, as a starting point, a world 
map published by National Geographic magazine 
in 2002 as part of  a special feature on megacities 
(Zwingle 2002). This startling map (Figure 1) helps 
the viewer visualize, thanks to clever graphic design, 
the magnitude of  recent demographic predictions. 
But this vision of  the future is jarring, not only for its 
dramatic depiction of  explosive population growth, 
but also for the fact that it upends the most familiar of  
cartographic representations. It positions the viewer 
below the equator, below the Tropic of  Capricorn 
even, and looking upwards—that is to say, it offers 
Northern eyes a view from the South. The perspective 
it offers, of  course, stands in direct opposition to the 
familiar Mercator projection, which famously exag-
gerated the size of  the temperate land areas relative 
to the tropics. Whereas with the Mercator projection, 
Europe grew to twice its true size relative to countries 
near the equator and the African continent shrunk 
ten-fold to the size of  Greenland (Snyder 1993, 48), 
in National Geographic’s future-oriented image of  
the world, it is the megacities of  the global South 
that loom large.
Such a view is reinforced by the proliferation of  
cultural productions in the West that take place in or 
focus on megacities, which novelist and critic Rana 
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Figure 1: Projection of the “cities of the future.” Map courtesy of the National Geographic Society, used with permission.
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Dasgupta interprets as follows: “the Third-World 
metropolis is becoming the symbol of  the ‘new’…
If, for the better part of  the 20th century, it was New 
York and its glistening imitations that symbolized the 
future, it is now the stacked-up, sprawling, impromptu 
city-countries of  the Third World” (2006). Referring 
to the fear and fascination such megacity spectacles 
arouse in Western audiences, Dasgupta surmises that 
what First-World eyes see in films like City of  God 
(Rio de Janeiro), The Constant Gardener (Nairobi), 
and Tsotsi (Soweto, Johannesburg) is what they 
believe will become increasingly familiar to them at 
home in years to come: “Perhaps the Third-World 
city is more than simply the source of  the things 
that will define the future, but actually is the future 
of  the western city.”
At first glance, envisioning the world in this 
manner seems to disrupt representations central to 
the durable fiction of  European superiority. (In the 
case of  the map, it seems quite literally to stand them 
on their head.) Others commentators discussing the 
portentous nature of  megacities appear to do the 
same. For example, the influential urbanist Mike 
Davis, in his book Planet of  Slums, argues, “the 
cities of  the future, rather than being made out of  
glass and steel as envisioned by earlier generations 
of  urbanists, are instead largely constructed out of  
crude brick, straw, recycled plastic, cement blocks, and 
scrap wood” (2006, 19). Likewise, journalist Robert 
Neuwirth (2005), reporting on squatter settlements 
in megacities of  four continents, sees them as vi-
sions of  the “new urban world.” However, where 
Neuwirth finds optimism in a future of  industrious 
squatters building lasting communities in the most 
adverse and precarious conditions, Davis sees a truly 
horrific global transformation: “Instead of  cities of  
light soaring toward heaven, much of  the twenty-first 
century urban world squats in squalor, surrounded 
by pollution, excrement, and decay” (2006, 19). 
Although seeing megacities as “cities of  the future” 
may pose a new challenge to commonly held histories 
and geographies of  urban modernity, Davis’s Third 
World dystopia has a long legacy. For centuries, North 
American and European (or, more broadly, modern-
ist) aesthetic sensibilities have been appalled by the 
“crowds, dirt, and disease” they encountered in the 
non-Western city (Chakrabarty 2002, 65-79).  
As geographer Matthew Gandy notes, there are 
two dominant modes of  analysis and interpretation 
of  the megacity: alarmist predictions of  urban apoca-
lypse discovered in the misery of  the slums and hope-
ful models of  a new urbanism found in the ingenuity 
of  informal markets and settlements (2005, 38-40). 
But while the megacity is sometimes discussed in a 
positive, even romantic, light, more often it is seen as 
the cause for alarm. Megacities are commonly indexed 
as sites of  explosive population growth and massive 
concentration of  poverty, and these conditions are 
seen to be exacerbated by the peril of  environmental 
deterioration and natural disaster. Jonathan Anjaria 
(Forthcoming) notes how commentators of  diverse 
political positions, such as Mike Davis and Robert 
Kaplan, share the same view of  cities of  the global 
South as failures. In line with Davis’s vision, cited 
above, Kaplan finds, in the cities of  West Africa, “the 
symbol of  worldwide demographic, environmental, 
and societal stress” (1994, 46). And Kaplan, like 
Davis, foresees disaster eventually coming “home.” 
These cities, he argues, are “an appropriate intro-
duction to the issues, often extremely unpleasant 
to discuss, that will soon confront our civilization” 
(Kaplan 1994, 46, my emphasis). 
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This compounded anxiety—a dystopia that is 
not just “over there,” but one that will soon be “over 
here”—has become almost routine in discussions 
of  megacities. In 2005, a popular environmental 
magazine added its voice to the chorus by publishing 
a cover story entitled “Cities of  the Future” (Mon-
tavalli et al. 2005). It, too, argues that the West must 
look to megacities like Jakarta, Dhaka, and Lagos as 
predictors of  the living conditions for the majority 
of  the earth’s population in the twenty-first century. 
And the authors’ intent is also to draw the attention 
of  the North to the chronic disasters of  megacities, 
all of  which suffer from “a catalog of  environmental 
ills” the article goes on to describe (Montavalli et al. 
2005, 29). Likewise, left-leaning periodicals targeted 
at critical intellectuals, when focusing on megacities, 
tend to conjur worldwide urban futures of  crisis, 
chaos, and collapse. A recent article in Harper’s Maga-
zine concurs: “metropolitan Manila…in its poverty, 
enormity, utter squalor, and lack of  services perfectly 
represents the catastrophic twenty-first-century vi-
sion of  the megacity” (Power 2006, 57). In a similar 
vein, the caption beneath a two-page photograph in 
The New Yorker, of  women living in the Lagos city 
dump, reads: “Lagos has become the archetype of  
the megacity, perhaps because its growth has been so 
explosive, perhaps because its cityscape has become 
so apocalyptic” (Packer 2006, 62-3). 
Whether these forecasts have utopian or dysto-
pian inflections, what ultimately concerns me here 
is their shared sense of  global transformation, in 
which the megacity slum is the paradigmatic urban 
space of  the twenty-first century. As world-renowned 
architect Rem Koolhaas says of  Africa’s largest 
megacity: “Lagos is not catching up with us. Rather, 
we may be catching up with Lagos” (Koolhaas et al. 
2001, 653; cited in Ferguson 2007, 75). Given the 
ubiquity of  this view, we need to ask, according to 
what relationships between history and geography, 
between time and space, do megacities and their 
slums take on such proleptic roles? What is at stake 
in claiming that familiar developmental narratives 
have collapsed, such that places once thought to be 
advancing towards the so-called great modern cities 
of  Europe and the United States have now come to 
represent to the North its own future?
Reordering the Space/Time of Urban 
Modernity?
As I have already suggested, initially, one may be 
tempted to view this discourse as a radical reordering 
of  the presumed relationship between history and 
geography so central to European modernity—a 
shift that would reflect, in cultural terms, the waning 
political and economic power of  Western (or, at the 
present moment, American) imperialism.2 It might 
then constitute a postcolonial critique par excel-
lence by scrambling these imagined spatiotemporal 
coordinates and displacing the positions of  the Third 
and First Worlds. However, the argument I wish to 
make is that, paradoxically, this discourse reinscribes 
and reinforces, even as it seems to rearrange and 
challenge, the historical logic and geographical order 
that has been central to the staging of  modernity in 
the West. And, as I hope will soon become clear, it 
does so with a disturbing twist: within this discourse, 
developmental promises are now rendered obsolete, 
the order in which cities of  rich and poor countries 
are expected to converge is inverted, and hopes of  
development in the South are replaced by fears of  
degeneration in the North.
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Seeing megacities as “cities of  the future” expands 
the boundaries of  urban modernity to include places 
once thought to be either outside of  historical time 
or lagging behind it. Yet this occurs in such a way 
as to fold other heterogeneous histories into the 
“global” history of  the West, by reorganizing them 
relative to the West’s own emergence (cf. Mitchell 
2000, xxi). As Timothy Mitchell puts it: “Accounts 
of  the modern world that introduce a topsy-turvy 
view…typically reestablish the order of  modernity 
by removing irregularities…and repositioning them 
within the West’s uniform and singular history” 
(2000, 7). Though, in the accounts cited in the 
previous section, developmental time is obviously 
unsettled by what anthropologist James Ferguson 
calls a “nonprogressive re-temporalization” (2006, 
192)—that is, history is now believed to be moving 
“backward” in the direction of  Lima and Lagos rather 
than “forward” towards Paris and New York—the 
“cities of  the future” narrative retains the singular 
logic of  historical time unfolding from one stage 
to the next. Here, we can expand Sarah Nuttall and 
Achille Mbembe’s objection to treating the slum as 
the defining feature of  the African metropolis, as 
it “reinserts the city [of  Johannesburg] into a more 
recognizable frame” (2005, 194).3 With Nuttall and 
Mbembe, we can ask of  the category of  the megac-
ity, “doesn’t [it] serve to confirm a dominant North 
American research mode for carving up the globe?” 
(2005, 194). The cities of  the global North, in this 
case, remain the hidden referent as the megacity 
discourse, in Mitchell’s terms, “recaptures histories 
happening elsewhere and returns them to the histori-
cal home of  the West” (2000, 12). Simply put, whose 
future is foreseen in the megacity?4 
Meanwhile, such a framing allows the current 
chaos and imminent catastrophe Northern observers 
see in the cities of  the global South to appear as the 
inevitable culmination of  a singular and universally 
unfolding history. It removes from view the fact 
that many of  these images of  “disorder” are actu-
ally signs of  an uneven geography of  wealth and 
power produced within, not outside of  or prior to, 
histories of  global capitalism (King 1990; Harvey 
2006). Here, the notion of  a linear unfolding of  
history towards megacities does mystifying work, 
concealing the extent to which the prosperity of  cit-
ies of  the imperial metropole has often been made 
possible by exploitative political-economic relations 
with the colonial periphery. It is true that the “force 
of  history,” as Mitchell calls it, accommodates a 
reversal of  the geography of  historical progress and 
a rejection of  the assumption that time always moves 
in progressive directions (cf. Ferguson 2006). Yet by 
considering what must be overlooked to fit megacities 
into the historical time of  the West, we see that this 
discourse ignores histories of  capital accumulation 
and structural underdevelopment by resituating 
cities of  the global South at the static endpoint of  
a linear, historical narrative centered in Europe and 
North America. 
Imagining these cities to represent the imminent, 
dystopic future of  Northern cities, and to no longer 
see them as struggling to catch up with the West, 
is merely a variation on the belief  that at any one 
moment in time places occupy different stages of  
history. World systems theorists (Wallerstein 1974) 
and the Latin American dependentista school (Frank 
1969; Cardoso and Faletto 1979) argued long ago that 
a synchronic (or, historical-structural) framework 
had to undo the “Eurocentric denial of  coevalness” 
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(cf. Fabian 2002) enacted by the U.S.-based ideology 
of  modernization and development (Grosfoguel 
2000, 357). These scholars demonstrated that such a 
paradigm shift was necessary to fully understand the 
unequal relations between countries, regions, and 
continents within the global economy, which led to 
the crucial point that “development and underde-
velopment coexist simultaneously in historical time” 
(Grosfoguel 2000, 360). Paradoxically, the same cri-
tique pertains to the idea that megacities are the “cities 
of  the future.” In Gandy’s more contemporary view, 
in which he applies a similar analysis to the megacity 
discourse, to see Lagos as the terminal condition of  
the cities of  the First World “is to occlude the fact 
that every extremity of  Lagos’s deterioration over 
the past quarter century has been linked, in inverse 
proportion, to the capital accumulated in Chicago, 
London or Los Angeles” (2005, 42).
Moreover, when history is “re-temporalized” in 
such nonprogressive ways, cities once thought to 
be advancing towards modernity are fixed in place 
within a static global hierarchy (cf. Ferguson 2006, 
189). As Ferguson argues: “Once modernity ceases 
to be understood as a telos, the question of  rank is 
de-developmentalized, and the stark differentiations 
of  the global social system sit raw and naked, no 
longer softened by the promises of  the ‘not yet’” 
(2006, 186). Accordingly, time is no longer expected 
to transform poor cities into rich ones, and waiting 
patiently in anticipation of  progress makes little 
sense. Ferguson points out that something is lost 
when the modernist “developmental narrative” is 
seen as a failure and discarded: “no one talks about 
African economic convergence with the First World 
anymore” (2006, 183). Likewise, within discussions of  
megacities, rarely is there talk about Lagos becoming 
like London; yet, as some begin to foresee London 
becoming more like Lagos, the notion of  convergence 
still carries weight—just not in the progressive way it 
once did. In Ferguson’s view, the re-temporalization 
of  the “global status system” transforms “the nature 
of  the relation between global rich and poor” such 
that the “key questions are no longer temporal ones 
of  becoming” (2006, 192). Thus, if  the status of  the 
megacities of  the Third World is fixed, and the cities 
of  the First World foresee in them their own future, 
then hopes of  development in the South morph 
into fears of  degeneration in the North (Ferguson 
2006, 189-92). As evidenced by immigration anxiet-
ies in North America and Europe, as well as by the 
worldwide spread of  wall-building projects at national 
borders, the imperative to prevent cities of  the global 
North from becoming “megacities” stimulates the 
proliferation of  numerous technologies of  fortressing 
and exclusion.
A (Mega)City at Risk 
The fact that the megacity discourse operates on 
the scale that it does, focusing on the cities of  the 
South as indicators of  a worldwide trend, and yet 
emanates primarily from North America and Europe, 
demonstrates its simultaneously globalist aspirations 
and provincial assumptions (cf. Tsing 2005, 55-80; 
Chakrabarty 2000).5 Though global in scope, the 
seemingly unlocated discourse of  the megacity is 
always articulated from particular locations: the 
explosion of  interest in the megacity does not come 
from the megacity—as Walter Mignolo (2005, 35) 
might say, its “locus of  enunciation” is elsewhere.6 
That said, this globalist discourse often becomes 
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grounded in particular places. Thus, a discussion of  
the global order of  the megacity discourse would 
be incomplete without raising the question of  what 
the category does in the world—what concrete and 
localized projects are enabled by it? If  we can see the 
global city, following geographer Jennifer Robinson 
(2002, 547), as a normative ideal that encourages 
calculated projects of  city management or “urban 
entrepreneurialism” (Harvey 1989) that work to attain 
such a status, we ought to be able to view the megacity 
as a category that encourages other governmental 
rationalities, which may have equally important real 
world effects. Following Robinson’s assertion that 
the global city is a “regulating fiction” that “can have 
devastating consequences for most people in the city, 
especially the poorest” (2002, 547), we must ask: 
What sorts of  projects are inspired and enabled by 
the “regulating fiction” of  the megacity?
Though we can approach this question in a num-
ber of  ways, the example I will use is a form of  urban 
governance that operates through the techno-politics 
of  risk. In the late twentieth century, as a number of  
theorists have argued, risk emerged as a rationality of  
rule and a technology of  government tied to a set of  
political programs aimed at the liberalization of  gov-
ernments, economies, and societies around the world 
(Dean 1999; Osborne and Rose 1999; Rose 1999). 
According to Nikolas Rose (1996), in “‘advanced’ 
liberal democracies,” the state’s active concern for 
the health and well-being of  the population, as well 
as its commitment to developmental imperatives 
such as jobs, education, and healthcare, shifted to 
operations that rational, self-regulating individuals are 
expected to perform on their own bodies, thoughts, 
and conduct (Foucault 2003). These insights have 
drawn attention to governmental efforts that promote 
“prudentialism” and personal responsibility for 
security from hazards, dangers, and risks (O’Malley 
1996, 2004). Such diffuse optics are instructive, and 
yet, if  they are focused more sharply, it becomes 
clear that the spread of  risk as a component of  
neoliberal governmentality throughout cities of  the 
global South, and its relation to the dismantling of  
the welfare (or, the developmentalist) state, depends 
on social practices that are made possible by and, 
in turn, produce certain framings of  the world—in 
particular, an imagination shaped by the megacity 
discourse and its dystopic fears of  chaos, collapse, 
and catastrophe. 
The example of  a governmental resettlement 
project in the city of  Bogotá, Colombia, well illus-
trates this dynamic. In 2003, the municipal govern-
ment of  Bogotá began a program aimed at relocating 
thousands of  informal settlements from what it has 
officially defined as “zonas de alto riesgo” (or, “zones 
of  high risk”)—peripheral neighborhoods deemed 
especially vulnerable to hazards such as floods, land-
slides, and earthquakes (see Figure 2). The precursor 
to this resettlement program could be traced back to 
the 1980s, when the United Nations Human Settle-
ment Programme (UN-HABITAT) began to promote 
risk assessments of  informal settlements in megacities 
throughout the global South.7 Bogotá’s resettlement 
program, however, would not have been possible 
without the World Bank. Since the beginning, it was 
aided by the Bank’s financial support and technical 
expertise, which drew upon a generalized policy 
for risk reduction and population resettlement in 
megacities of  the developing world (cf. Mejía 1996). 
In 2006, following years of  financial aid and technical 
advice, the World Bank approved another loan of  
US$80 million to the city of  Bogotá designated to 
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risk management and disaster vulnerability. And the 
Bank’s influence has not been limited to the city of  
Bogotá: in 2005, it was supporting and guiding 45 
similar resettlement programs in megacities across 
Latin America (Correa and Villegas 2005).8
The case of  risk and resettlement in Bogotá 
certainly belongs within the familiar history of  rela-
tions between Northern development agencies and 
Southern governments. The World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund have, for decades, 
worked to impose structural adjustment reforms 
through loan conditionalities and to promote “good 
governance” among countries of  the global South 
(Escobar 1995). And yet we must not lose sight of  
the fact that the terms of  these relationships change 
alongside shifts in dominant paradigms of  develop-
ment. As institutional priorities respond to internal 
Figure 2: The remains of a house located in one of Bogotá’s “zones of high risk.” The house was recently demolished after 
its former occupants agreed to participate in the CVP resettlement program. Photograph by Author.
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and external critiques, new frameworks arise that 
classify the objects of  development (cities, countries, 
regions, populations, etc.) according to different 
criteria (Goldman 2005; Ferguson 1994). Thus, to 
view the recent intense interest in the problem of  risk 
only as a response to unpredictable social, political, 
and environmental conditions in Bogotá—even to 
understand it as a Colombian (or Latin American) 
phenomenon—would be to ignore the fact that 
Bogotá, as one of  the places now included among 
the “Third World megacities,” is situated within a set 
of  relationships that extends far beyond its boundar-
ies (cf. Massey 1994). Adopting the terms Ferguson 
uses to characterize Africa’s standing within the 
wider categorical system he calls the “global order,” 
we must also view Bogotá as a “place-in-the-world” 
(2006, 5-6). For, as I have argued above, the megacity 
discourse classifies places like Bogotá within a group 
of  cities with certain dysfunctional characteristics 
that are assumed to be shared among them: uncon-
trollable population growth, extreme concentration 
of  poverty, deteriorating environmental conditions, 
and so on. Furthermore, since the global order 
imagined by this discourse discards the modernist 
narrative of  progress—that is, Third World cities are 
no longer on the path to development, but rather to 
collapse, catastrophe, and chaos—transnational aid 
and expertise that may have once been invested in 
social services, welfare, infrastructure, education, and 
healthcare have been replaced by programs designed 
to promote precaution, preparedness, and prudential-
ism throughout a population of  “responsibilized” 
citizens (Lakoff  2007; Rose 1999). Once framed by 
the megacity discourse, Bogotá becomes a city “at 
risk,” which, in turn, diagnoses the problem to be 
addressed by institutions like the World Bank.9
These are just some of  the concrete consequences 
of  policy changes that occur on multiple scales once a 
city is seen by multilateral development organizations 
as a problem of  risk. There are others, as well, such 
as the promotion of  popular education campaigns 
designed to train prudential individuals to prepare 
themselves and their families for any number of  
potential misfortunes, ranging from the loss of  a 
job or a fire in the home to a terrorist attack or an 
earthquake. Such efforts inevitably draw from and 
promote the influence of  new sources of  knowledge 
and expertise, such as risk management and actuarial 
science. On the institutional level, we see similar 
shifts, such as increased investment in preparedness 
plans that seek to ensure that governmental agen-
cies can and will respond efficiently and effectively 
to problems that arise and threaten to disturb the 
productive capacity or political stability of  the city. 
The fortunes of  national economies are now increas-
ingly believed to be predicated on the ability of  major 
cities to attract and maintain foreign investment in 
tourism, services, infrastructure, manufacturing, real 
estate, and information technology. Since a significant 
disturbance in the normal functioning of  the city 
might result in widespread economic downturn or 
collapse, not to mention social and political unrest, 
national governments have come to view the entire 
urban assemblage as a security concern. 
My critique of  narrowly-conceived policies and 
programs that focus exclusively on risk—and, in 
doing so, shift attention and resources away from 
concerns such as poverty, rights, equality, education, 
housing, healthcare, or justice—is meant to have 
implications for the practice of  urban planning. But, 
to be clear, my aim is neither to condemn this par-
ticular program nor denounce the dissemination and 
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circulation of  abstract ideas, models, and plans for 
development and governance in cities of  the global 
South (even those driven by Northern institutions 
like the World Bank).10 As urban planner and theorist 
Ananya Roy argues: “This is not simply an issue of  
the inappropriateness of  Euro-American ideas for 
Third World cities. Planning practices are constantly 
borrowed and replicated across borders. To attempt 
to stem this tide is rather useless and indeed under 
some circumstances can mark a turn to isolationism” 
(2005, 147). Following Roy, my critique is aimed, 
not at the transnational circulation of  abstract plan-
ning and development discourses and practices, 
but more precisely at the peculiar and provincial 
assumptions—such as those associated with by the 
megacity discourse—on which the travel of  certain 
ideas, models, and plans are based.11
Thinking Beyond the Megacity
In closing, another clarification and then a provoca-
tion. It may seem that I have argued that it is neces-
sary to examine the discursive construction of  the 
megacity, and in some ways this is what I have done. 
I do urge that we must consider how concepts like 
the megacity are never purely empirical categories or 
analytical tools, but are also discursive formations, 
loose in the world, producing effects, and possessing 
social, cultural, and political lives of  their own (cf. 
Hall 1978). Their sphere of  influence extends far 
beyond the articles, reports, and books written in 
North America and Europe. As such, the socially-
constructed category of  the megacity should be seen 
to enframe a field of  thought and action, consolidate 
networks of  actors, and render cities commensurate, 
thus enabling abstract policies and programs to be 
implemented concretely in particular locations.
Surely, it is not a stretch to consider how con-
ceptual maps dividing the world into megacities and 
global cities are simultaneously empirical tools and 
discursive formations. But I also caution against 
explaining their function in terms of  the empirical 
and the discursive, the real and the imaginary, the 
concrete and the abstract, for to do so would endorse 
their claim to represent a world of  which they are not 
a part (cf. Mitchell 1991, 2000, 2002). For alterna-
tives, we might turn to Edward Soja’s (1996) notions 
of  “Thirdspace” and the “real-and-imagined” or to 
Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) concept of  the “spatial triad” 
(which combines spaces of  representation, represen-
tational space, and lived space): both attempt to re-
think the same dualism in direct relation to space and 
to the urban question. Following Mitchell’s approach 
here, I insist that rather than criticizing the category 
of  megacity for how poorly it corresponds to the 
lived realities of  the places it claims to represent, we 
must ask: What does the megacity do, not as either an 
empirical description or a cultural representation of  
the real world, but as one of  the many objects within 
it? Then we can see how the megacity asserts itself  as 
a mere representation—either an analytical category 
that claims objectively to describe the world without 
itself  being a part of  it or a discursive category that 
claims merely to construct that world without playing 
a role in bringing it into being. And we realize, then, 
that the category of  megacity also testifies to the 
reality of  the world it claims to represent. 
Mitchell argues that representations always make 
this double claim of  denying their own reality and 
confirming the reality of  the world they depict.12 Thus 
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he leads us to methodologies that scrutinize the social 
practices that frame time and space in particular ways. 
Extending Mitchell’s argument, it is perhaps only once 
we denaturalize the staging of  the world according to 
this script that it becomes possible to imagine other 
forms of  “city-ness” (Robinson 2006) beyond those 
that reinforce the historical logic and geographical 
order that have underpinned Euro-American imperi-
alism and capitalist modernity. Such a task is especially 
necessary at the present moment, when influential 
imaginations of  the global order, as I have argued, 
fix the cities of  the global South in place within a 
de-developmentalized global hierarchy. The question, 
then, according to Mitchell, “is whether one can find 
a way to theorize the question of  modernity”—or 
the city, for my purposes—“that relocates it within 
a global context and, at the same time, enables that 
context to complicate, rather than simply reverse, the 
narrative logic of  modernization” (2000, 7). He argues 
that we can move beyond this predicament by taking 
into account the practices through which cities of  the 
global South are made to appear different—how the 
megacity discourse is a means by which this differ-
ence is produced (cf. Bhabha 2004). Yet, following 
Mitchell, we can also look to places that have been 
captured by the category of  megacity and see what 
displacements are opened up by and within these 
spaces of  difference. 
There is an obvious need to search for new 
vocabularies and epistemologies (cf. Roy 2005)—to 
“practice ways of  seeing and engaging urban spaces” 
(Simone 2004, 408)—that present alternatives to the 
ones supplied by the discourse on Third World mega-
cities (the work of  photographer Dionisio González, 
including the image that immediately precedes this 
essay as well as Figure 3 above, offers imaginative 
possibilities).13 As Robinson argues, categorizations 
of  cities matter and must be interrogated because 
“they limit our potential to contribute to envisioning 
possible city futures” (2002, 546). Following her chal-
lenge to the categorical imperative of  urban studies 
Figure 3: Dionisio González, “Aguas Espraiadas II,” 2004, c-print, diasec. Print courtesy of Fiedler Contemporary, Cologne.
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in general, and sharpening its focus onto the megac-
ity discourse, I believe much popular and scholarly 
thinking about cities of  the global South “needs to 
decolonize its imagination about city-ness…if  it is to 
sustain its relevance to the key urban challenges of  
the twenty-first century” (2002, 546). This essay has 
attempted to address that challenge by arguing that we 
ought to be wary of  categories that appear to elude 
the historical logic and geographic order that have 
upheld Euro-American modernity and imperialism 
while they, in effect, reinscribe them—and reinscribe 
them, this time, without their salutary promise of  
change for the better. While concrete proposals are 
beyond the scope of  this essay, I want to ask whether, 
by pushing beyond this juncture, we can begin to 
imagine the proliferation, dissemination, and circula-
tion of  other forms of  theory and practice that may 
truly engender radical new forms of  urbanism, not 
to mention social relations and political-economic 
configurations.
Austin Zeiderman is a PhD Candidate in Cultural and Social 
Anthropology at Stanford University whose work focuses an 
anthropological lens on the cultural and political dimensions of  
cities and urban space. In Bogotá, Colombia, he is conducting 
an ethnographic study of  risk as an emergent technology of  
urban governance.
Lead Photograph
Dionisio González, “Buraco Quente II,” 2006, c-
print, diasec. Print courtesy of  Fiedler Contemporary, 
Cologne (http://www.ulrichfiedler.com).
Notes
1 The notion of  “big but not powerful” adequately sums 
up the twin characteristics most often associated with the 
relatively new category of  the “megacity”:  their massive 
demographic and spatial dimensions combined with their 
relative powerlessness (if  not structural irrelevance) within 
the primary circuits of  production and exchange of  the 
global economy (Castells 1996; Sassen 1994).  For example, 
when Mike Davis provides a table listing the “Third World 
Megacities,” the apparent criteria for inclusion among this 
group are simply demographic size and world-economic 
status (i.e., “Third World”) (2006, 4).  (However, Davis 
ambiguously includes New York among the list of  “Third 
World Megacities.”  It remains unclear to the reader whether 
this is a comparative gesture, an editorial oversight, or an 
ironic joke.)
2 In a related example, in late February 2007, when a 
significant drop in the Shanghai stock market caused a 
global stock slide, commentators expressed shock at the 
spatial and temporal dimensions of  the event, which 
reversed the presumed causal relationship between the 
New York Stock Exchange and Chinese financial markets. 
“It’s not supposed to work this way,” remarked a stunned 
financial analyst interviewed by the BBC.  
3 Here, Nuttall and Mbembe are responding to a critique 
by geographer Michael Watts (2005) of  an earlier article of  
theirs on Johannesburg (Mbembe and Nuttall 2004).
4 The megacity is definitely not seen as a vision of  the future 
by those for whom it is the present.  As Ferguson argues, 
referring to the claim that we are in a “post-development 
era,” the “loss of  credulity toward narratives of  social and 
economic development has occurred not universally, but 
in specific ways and in specific places” (2006, 182-3).  This 
fact was made starkly clear during a conversation with an 
ambitious, aspiring, and well-educated political figure in 
Bogotá.  He argued that Third World cities have the right 
to follow the example set by the great cities of  Europe and 
North America and, thus, to enact major urban renewal 
projects and often violent demolitions in the name of  
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modernization.  His is not a view that sees Bogotá’s current 
state as indicative of  “cities of  the future,” and yet it also 
remains centrally located within the dominant narrative of  
urban progress and modernity.  As does it reflect the same 
relationship between historical movement and geographical 
order that I discuss in relation to the megacity discourse.
5 As Nuttall and Mbembe point out with reference to 
Michael Watts’ critique, “outsiders speak from places and 
within paradigms that carry their own baggage.  One result 
may be a failure to see when one’s own rules might not apply 
or when political, ideological, and hermeneutic certainty is 
not guaranteed” (2005, 193).
6 Mignolo’s idea of  the “locus of  enunciation” is part of  
his larger critique of  modernity/coloniality.  Referring to 
philosopher Edmundo O’Gorman’s thesis on the “univer-
salism of  Western culture,” he argues:  “‘Occidentalism’…
has two interrelated dimensions:  First, it served to locate 
the geo-historical space of  Western culture.  But, less 
obviously, it also fixed the privileged locus of  enunciation. 
It is from the West that the rest of  the world is described, 
conceptualized, and ranked:  that is, modernity is the 
self-description of  Europe’s role in history rather than an 
ontological historical process” (Mignolo 2005, 35).
7  This observation was made by Antonio Manrique, 
Professor of  Architecture in Bogotá’s University of  the 
Andes, during our conversations in August 2006.  Professor 
Manrique was involved in discussions and projects having 
to do with the UN initiative during this time.
8 To further demonstrate this point, one could look to a 
recent conference jointly organized by the World Bank 
and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in 
May 2005.  The conference was titled, “Foro Técnico 
sobre Reasentamiento de Población en América Latina y el 
Caribe” (or, “Technical Forum on Involuntary Resettlement 
in Latin America and the Caribbean”).  It took place, 
coincidentally, in Bogotá.  This conference followed a 2002 
meeting in Salvador de Bahía, Brazil, and sought to further 
a regional dialogue on generally applicable methodologies, 
financial instruments, and legal mechanisms among 
academics, non-governmental organizations, consulting 
firms, development experts, and representatives from local 
and national governments implementing similar programs 
in São Paulo, Buenos Aires, Bogotá, Mexico City, Rio de 
Janeiro, and other cities.  This conference did not focus 
officially on megacities, and in fact it included presentations 
about experiences with involuntary resettlement in small 
cities as well as rural areas across Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  However, the category of  megacity makes it 
possible for managers, experts, planners, and politicians 
from these diverse locations to imagine space in such a way 
that made their cities equivalent, and therefore able to be 
understood and operated on using the legal tools, financial 
instruments, and project methodologies that emerge from 
conferences such as this one.
9 An important question remains:  Are the models of  
neoliberal governmentality that are currently spreading 
throughout cities and urban governments of  the global 
South being (re)imported to the global North?  Without 
conducting further research or relying heavily on those more 
familiar with the urban policy landscape of  North America 
and Europe, I am unable to provide an answer.  However, I 
am grateful to the editors of  Critical Planning for pointing 
this out as a critical trajectory for future inquiry.
10 The persistence of  Euro-American expertise in 
continuing to see itself  as offering “advanced First World 
solutions” to “backward Third World problems” has been 
justly criticized, to such an extent that many other less 
paternalistic models of  participatory development have 
emerged.
11 In contrast to the viewpoint offered by the megacity 
discourse, Roy’s interest is “in what it means to locate 
the production of  theory and policy in the cities of  the 
developing world” (2005, 147).  I suspect that, were this to 
take place, the megacity would cease to be as popular of  a 
concept (see also f. 4).
12 Mitchell argues that the representation “always asserts that 
it is only a text, a mere picture, a copy, a play, a scheme, a 
framework, an abstraction, a projection, not something real. 
It defines itself  by what it lacks, its missing originality, its 
immateriality, its want of  immediate presence, by the gap 
Critical Planning Summer 2008 37
in time, space, and substance that separates it from the 
real thing.  On the other hand, in asserting its own lack, a 
representation claims that the world it replicates, projects, 
reorganizes, enacts, or endows with meaning and structure 
must be, by contrast, original, material, immediately present, 
complete in itself, without lack, undelayed, filling its own 
time and space—in a word (what we imagine as) real” 
(2000, 18).
13 As Roy puts it:  “There is an urgency for urban studies 
and planning to move beyond the dichotomy of  First 
World ‘models’ and Third World ‘problems.’  One possible 
route is through policy approaches that seek to learn from 
Third World cities,” such as seeing urban informality as 
“an important epistemology for planning” (2005, 147, 
156). However, alternative urban imaginaries emerge from 
a number of  different sources outside of  formal policy 
and planning circles, such as from the work of  urban 
social movements or artists. The photographic creations 
of  Dionisio González accomplish such a task by piecing 
together images of  shantytowns and modern architecture 
to create representations of  urban landscapes that challenge 
a number of  the assumptions discussed in this essay (see 
http://www.ulrichfiedler.com).
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